Fix typos

docs/docs/adrs/adr-002-throttle.md

@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ In summary, the throttling mechanism as designed has desirable properties whethe
 ### Negative
 
 * Throttling introduces a vector for a malicious consumer chain to halt the provider, see issue below. 
-  However, this is sacrificing liveness in a edge case scenario for the sake of security. 
+  However, this is sacrificing liveness in an edge case scenario for the sake of security. 
   As an improvement, [using retries](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/issues/713) would fully prevent this attack vector.
 
 ### Neutral

docs/docs/adrs/adr-013-equivocation-slashing.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ As a first iteration, we propose the following approach. At the moment the provi
 1. slash all the undelegations and redelegations using `slashFactor`;
 2. slash all delegations using as voting `power` the sum of the voting power of the misbehaving validator and the power of all the ongoing undelegations and redelegations.
 
-**Evidence expiration:** Additionally, because we cannot infer the actual time of the evidence (i.e., the timestamp of the evidence cannot be trusted), we do not consider _evidence expiration_ and hence old evidence is never ignored (e.g., the provider would act on 3 year-old evidence of equivocation on a consumer).
+**Evidence expiration:** Additionally, because we cannot infer the actual time of the evidence (i.e., the timestamp of the evidence cannot be trusted), we do not consider _evidence expiration_ and hence old evidence is never ignored (e.g., the provider would act on 3-year-old evidence of equivocation on a consumer).
 Additionally, we do not need to store equivocation evidence to avoid slashing a validator more than once, because we [do not slash](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/v0.47.0/x/evidence/keeper/infraction.go#L94) tombstoned validators and we [tombstone](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/v0.47.0/x/evidence/keeper/infraction.go#L138) a validator when slashed.
 
 We do not act on evidence that was signed by a validator [consensus key](https://tutorials.cosmos.network/tutorials/9-path-to-prod/3-keys.html#what-validator-keys) that is _pruned_ when we receive the evidence. We prune a validator's consensus key if the validator has assigned a new consumer key (using `MsgAssignConsumerKey`) and an unbonding period on the consumer chain has elapsed (see [key assignment ADR](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/blob/main/docs/docs/adrs/adr-001-key-assignment.md)). Note that the provider chain is informed that the unbonding period has elapsed on the consumer when the provider receives a `VSCMaturedPacket` and because of this, if the consumer delays the sending of a `VSCMaturedPacket`, we would delay the pruning of the key as well.

docs/docs/adrs/adr-016-securityaggregation.md

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ type PowerSource interface {
 func (k *Keeper) MixPowers(source ...PowerSource) []abci.ValidatorUpdate {
   var valUpdate []abci.ValidatorUpdate
   for _, ps := range source {
-    // mix powers from two sets of validator updates an return set of validator updates
+    // mix powers from two sets of validator updates a return set of validator updates
     // with aggregated powers
     valUpdate = mixPower(valUpdate, ps.GetValidatorUpdates())
   }