Break out features section into sub pages in preparation for 23.11 ch…

…anges.

src/SUMMARY.md

@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
 - [Introduction](introduction/README.md)
 - [Background](background/README.md)
 - [CheriBSD features](features/README.md)
+  - [Kernel compilation modes](features/kernel.md)
+  - [Process environments](features/processes.md)
+  - [CheriABI desktop environment](features/desktop.md)
+  - [Userlevel heap temporal memory safety](features/temporal.md)
+  - [Userlevel software compartmentalization](features/c18n.md)
+  - [bhyve hypervisor](features/bhyve.md)
 - [Unsupported FreeBSD features](nonfeatures/README.md)
 - [Getting CheriBSD](getting/README.md)
   - [Downloading image files](downloading/README.md)

src/features/README.md

@@ -1,83 +1,14 @@
 # CheriBSD features
 
 CheriBSD extends FreeBSD with added CHERI-enabled features, such as kernel and
-userspace memory safety.
-Some of these features are in the main CheriBSD branch; other experimental
-features  remain on development branches.
-
-## Kernel compilation modes
-
-The CheriBSD kernel can be compiled either as hybrid or pure-capability code:
-
-- The **hybrid kernel** enables capability use in userspace while making
-  relatively little use of capabilities in the kernel's own implementation.
-- The **pure-capability kernel** implements strong referential and spatial
-  memory protection internally in the kernel, protecting against memory-safety
-  vulnerabilities in components such as the network stack and system-call
-  layer.
-
-## Userspace process environments
-
-The CheriBSD userspace likewise supports two different execution environments,
-hybrid processes and CheriABI (pure-capability) processes:
-
-- **Hybrid processes** provide strong binary compatibility with the non-CHERI
-  version of the same architecture -- for example, aarch64 on Morello.
-- **CheriABI processes** implement strong referential and spatial memory
-  protection through the system-call interface, dynamic linker, language
-  runtime including heap memory allocators, and compiler-generated code.
-  This protects against memory memory-safety vulnerabilities in both system
-  services and applications.
-  CheriABI is described in an [ASPLOS 2019
-  paper](https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/201904-asplos-cheriabi.pdf).
-
-Both environments can be used over either of the hybrid or pure-capability
-kernels.
-
-Pre-compiled third-party software applications (packages) are provided for
-both ABIs, although CheriABI packages are currently considered experimental.
-This is discussed further in the [chapter on packages](../packages/).
+userspace memory safety:
 
-## CheriABI desktop environment (experimental)
+ * [Kernel compilation modes](kernel.md)
+ * [Process environments](processes.md)
+ * [CheriABI desktop environment (experimental)](desktop.md)
+ * [Userlevel heap temporal memory safety (experimental)](temporal.md)
+ * [Userlevel software compartmentalization (experimental)](c18n.md)
+ * [bhyve hypervisor (experimental)](bhyve.md)
 
-As of the 22.12 release, the installer has gained the option to install a
-desktop environment using the Mali Bifrost GPU on the Morello System-on-Chip.
-The option installs a basic desktop environment using KDE and Wayland
-compiled for CheriABI with the `cheri-desktop` package.  It also
-installs a hybrid ABI Firefox web browser via the `cheri-desktop-hybrid-extras`
-package.
-
-## Userspace heap temporal memory safety (experimental)
-
-CheriBSD implements, on an experimental development branch, support for the
-Cornucopia heap temporal safety algorithm, as well as successor algorithms
-based on load-side-barrier features present in the Morello prototype
-architecture and processor design.
-Cornucopia is described in an [IEEE SSP 2020
-paper](https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/2020oakland-cornucopia.pdf).
-
-## Software compartmentalization (experimental)
-
-CheriBSD implements two different
-CHERI-enabled software compartmentalization models:
-
-- **Colocated processes (co-processes) compartmentalization** accelerates
-  UNIX Inter-Process Communication (IPC) and context switching by colocating
-  multiple processes in the same address space, separating them using CHERI
-  capabilities.  Support for co-processes is maintained in an experimental
-  development branch and is not included in current software releases.
-  For more information see the [Colocation Tutorial](https://github.com/CTSRD-CHERI/cheripedia/wiki/Colocation-Tutorial)
-  wiki page.
-- **Dynamic-linker-based compartmentalization** isolates shared libraries
-  within a process using CHERI capabilities limiting the access of attackers
-  who have achieved arbitrary code execution within a library.
-  Initial support for linker-based library compartmentalization is included
-  in the 22.12 release of CheriBSD.  See the compartmentalization(7) manual
-  page on an installed system for more information.
-
-## Virtualization (experimental)
-
-CheriBSD implements, on an experimental development branch, CHERI extensions
-to FreeBSD's bhyve Type 2 hypervisor on the Morello architecture.
-This allows bhyve to host CHERI-enabled virtual machines, including those
-running CheriBSD.
+Some of these features are in the main CheriBSD branch; other experimental
+features remain on development branches.

src/features/bhyve.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# bhyve hypervisor (experimental)
+
+CheriBSD implements, on an experimental development branch, CHERI extensions
+to FreeBSD's bhyve Type 2 hypervisor on the Morello architecture.
+This allows bhyve to host CHERI-enabled virtual machines, including those
+running CheriBSD.

src/features/c18n.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Userlevel software compartmentalization (experimental)
+
+CheriBSD implements two different
+CHERI-enabled software compartmentalization models:
+
+- **Colocated processes (co-processes) compartmentalization** accelerates
+  UNIX Inter-Process Communication (IPC) and context switching by colocating
+  multiple processes in the same address space, separating them using CHERI
+  capabilities.  Support for co-processes is maintained in an experimental
+  development branch and is not included in current software releases.
+  For more information see the [Colocation Tutorial](https://github.com/CTSRD-CHERI/cheripedia/wiki/Colocation-Tutorial)
+  wiki page.
+- **Dynamic-linker-based compartmentalization** isolates shared libraries
+  within a process using CHERI capabilities limiting the access of attackers
+  who have achieved arbitrary code execution within a library.
+  Initial support for linker-based library compartmentalization is included
+  in the 22.12 release of CheriBSD.  See the compartmentalization(7) manual
+  page on an installed system for more information.

src/features/desktop.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# CheriABI desktop environment (experimental)
+
+As of the 22.12 release, the installer has gained the option to install a
+desktop environment using the Mali Bifrost GPU on the Morello System-on-Chip.
+The option installs a basic desktop environment using KDE and Wayland
+compiled for CheriABI with the `cheri-desktop` package.  It also
+installs a hybrid ABI Firefox web browser via the `cheri-desktop-hybrid-extras`
+package.

src/features/kernel.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Kernel compilation modes
+
+The CheriBSD kernel can be compiled either as hybrid or pure-capability code:
+
+- The **hybrid kernel** enables capability use in userspace while making
+  relatively little use of capabilities in the kernel's own implementation.
+- The **pure-capability kernel** implements strong referential and spatial
+  memory protection internally in the kernel, protecting against memory-safety
+  vulnerabilities in components such as the network stack and system-call
+  layer.

src/features/processes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Userlevel process environments
+
+The CheriBSD userspace likewise supports two different execution environments,
+hybrid processes and CheriABI (pure-capability) processes:
+
+- **Hybrid processes** provide strong binary compatibility with the non-CHERI
+  version of the same architecture -- for example, aarch64 on Morello.
+- **CheriABI processes** implement strong referential and spatial memory
+  protection through the system-call interface, dynamic linker, language
+  runtime including heap memory allocators, and compiler-generated code.
+  This protects against memory memory-safety vulnerabilities in both system
+  services and applications.
+  CheriABI is described in an [ASPLOS 2019
+  paper](https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/201904-asplos-cheriabi.pdf).
+
+Both environments can be used over either of the hybrid or pure-capability
+kernels.
+
+Pre-compiled third-party software applications (packages) are provided for
+both ABIs, although CheriABI packages are currently considered experimental.
+This is discussed further in the [chapter on packages](../packages/).

src/features/temporal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Userlevel heap temporal memory safety (experimental)
+
+CheriBSD implements, on an experimental development branch, support for the
+Cornucopia heap temporal safety algorithm, as well as successor algorithms
+based on load-side-barrier features present in the Morello prototype
+architecture and processor design.
+Cornucopia is described in an [IEEE SSP 2020
+paper](https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/2020oakland-cornucopia.pdf).